The size of the output gap coefficient is the key determinant of whether quantitative easing since 2009 and continued near-zero interest rates can by justified by a Taylor rule. Fed Chair Ben Bernanke and Vice-Chair Janet Yellen have argued that John Taylor proposed a monetary policy rule with a larger output gap coefficient in his 1999 paper than in his 1993 paper, and have used this argument to justify negative prescribed interest rates in 2009-2010 and near-zero interest rates through 2015. While Taylor neither proposed nor advocated a different rule in 1999 than in 1993, he did not draw a distinction between the implications of the two rules. In accord with
Introduction
When should the Fed start to raise interest rates above the zero lower bound? Should the First proposed in Taylor (1993) , these rules have become the dominant metric for both normative and positive monetary policy analysis.
In its original form, the Taylor rule prescribes that the Fed conduct policy according to a rule where the federal funds rate equals one plus 1.5 times the inflation rate plus 0.5 times the output gap. In Taylor (1999) , he also considered a rule with an output gap coefficient of 1.0. Alternatively, the Taylor rule can be formulated with the unemployment gap as the measure of real economic activity. With an Okun's Law coefficient of 2.0, a coefficient of 0.5 on the output gap is equivalent to a coefficient of 1.0 on the unemployment gap, and a coefficient of 1.0 on the output gap is equivalent to a coefficient of 2.0 on the unemployment gap.
After the federal funds rate hit the zero lower bound in December 2008, there was a great deal of debate over whether the implied Taylor rule interest rate was negative. If the answer is yes, this provides a justification for the Fed's subsequent quantitative easing but, if the answer is no, the Taylor rule does not provide a rationale for quantitative easing. 1 Although the details differ among the various papers, part of the answer is clear. Taylor rules with higher output or unemployment gap coefficients produced negative implied interest rates, while those with lower coefficients did not. For example, the unemployment rate in early 2011 was 9.0 percent and inflation (depending on the exact measure) was about 2.0 percent. If the natural rate of unemployment was 5.0 percent, the unemployment gap was -4.0 percent. While a Taylor rule with a lower unemployment gap coefficient prescribes a zero federal funds rate, the same rule with a higher unemployment gap coefficient would prescribe a rate of negative 4.0 percent. With low inflation, almost all of the differences in the Taylor rule prescriptions come from the size of the output or unemployment gap coefficients.
Following its January 2012 meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) issued a statement that future economic conditions are "likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the Federal Funds rate at least through late 2014." The committee also issued interest rate projections of the individual FOMC members. The median projection was that the rate would stay unchanged through 2013 before rising to 0.75 percent in 2014. Rosenberg (2012) to 1997:Q3, and find substantial differences in the prescribed rates from the two rules. Taylor's revised output gaps are much smaller than our real-time gaps during and following recessions, minimizing the effect of using rules with different output gap coefficients.
It is important to understand the distinction between real-time data available to policymakers and real-time data available to researchers. While the real-time output gaps that we use were all available to policymakers, none were available to Taylor when he wrote the paper. The linear detrended output gaps were constructed using real-time GNP data from the Philadelphia Fed Real-Time Data Set for
Macroeconomists, which was not available until the release of Croushore and Stark (1999) . The internal Fed real-time output gaps were also not publicly available in 1997, and are now released with about a five-year lag.
Taylor (1999) identified several "policy mistakes" where the federal funds rate was either above or below the prescribed Taylor rule rate, as well as periods where policy was "on track" with the federal funds rate about equal to the implied Taylor rule rate. The largest policy mistake was for the 1970s, where the federal funds rate was below the rates prescribed by both rules for virtually the entire decade, leading 
Taylor's Rule and its Modifications
Following Taylor (1993) , the monetary policy rule postulated to be followed by central banks can be specified as There are many other modifications of Taylor rules, including using forecasted instead of realized inflation, incorporating the unemployment gap instead of the output gap, including a lagged interest rate and/or the real exchange rate, and using a different equilibrium real interest rate and/or inflation target.
Since the focus of this paper is the analysis of different output gap coefficients with real-time data in the context of the results in Taylor (1999), we will not explore any of these modifications.
Taylor Rules with Real-Time Data
Following Orphanides (2001) , it has become standard practice to use real-time data that was available to policymakers at the time that interest rate setting decisions were made for both positive and 
Taylor Rules from the 1960s to the 1990s
Taylor ( 
Taylor Rules in the Late 1960s
When inflation started to rise in the mid-1960s, the Fed, according to the Taylor principle, should have raised the interest rate by more than the inflation rate. The use of real-time data reinforces Taylor's conclusion that the late 1960s was an example of a policy mistake, as the difference between the actual and prescribed rates is larger with real-time than with revised data for both rules. While it is clear why Taylor did not draw a distinction between the rates implied by the two rules with revised data, the distinction is obvious with real-time data.
Taylor Rules in the 1970s
Monetary policy in the 1970s is widely regarded as being too stimulative. This is illustrated in the top panel of Figure 2 , which plots the federal funds rate and the interest rate implied by the two rules with revised data. The actual interest rate is below both of the prescribed rates from 1971 through 1979. There is very little difference in the rates implied by the two rules, and the gap between the federal funds rate and the rate implied by either of the rules is much larger than the gap between the rates prescribed by the two rules. Taylor (1999) describes deviations from the baseline in the 1970s as the second most serious policy mistake in twentieth-century U.S. history (the Great Depression of the 1930s being the most serious). He argues that, while there is uncertainty regarding its causes, there is little doubt that it was responsible for the Great Inflation of the 1970s and, if a policy closer to that implied by the Taylor rule was followed, the rise in inflation may have been avoided.
The picture is very different with real-time data. As depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 2 The federal funds rate implied by the two rules with real-time data, as well at the actual rate, is depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 3 . Both the gap between the actual and implied federal funds rates and the gap between the rates implied by the two rules are larger with real-time than with revised data.
Moreover, the rate implied by the rule with an output gap coefficient of 0.5 is smaller than the actual rate and the rate implied by the rule with an output gap coefficient of 1.0 is smaller than the rate implied by the rule with an output gap coefficient of 0.5. With the larger output gap coefficient, the implied federal funds rate hits the zero lower bound from 1982:4 to 1984:1.
We again use Okun's Law to ask whether Taylor's revised HP detrended output gaps or our realtime linear detrended output gaps are more reasonable from the perspective of policymakers at the time. While the gap between the actual and implied federal funds rates and the gap between the rates implied by the two policy rules are both larger with real-time linearly detrended than with revised HP detrended data, that does not imply Taylor's conclusion would have been altered if he had been able to use real-time data. If the Fed's need to establish credibility and keep inflation expectations from rising justifies higher than Taylor-rule-implied interest rates, then the question of how much higher is beyond the scope of the paper.
Taylor Rules in the Late 1980s and 1990s
Monetary policy in the late 1980s and 1990s is generally regarded as successful. The close fit between the federal funds rate and the implied Taylor 
Conclusions
There is widespread agreement that the Taylor Taylor (1993) , but also that he did not make a distinction between the federal funds rates implied the different rules, only between the rates implied by the rules and the actual rate.
This paper has shown that Taylor did not distinguish between the rates implied by the two rules because he used revised data with a Hodrick-Prescott filter to construct the output gap rather than realtime data available to policymakers (but not to Taylor when he wrote the paper). While internal Fed (Greenbook) output gap data does not exist before 1987, we show that real-time linear detrending provides a good approximation to output gaps constructed from a real-time Okun's Law calculation in the earlier period.
We focus here on two important historical episodes. It is generally agreed that monetary policy in the early and mid-1970s was too stimulative, contributing to subsequent high inflation. With revised data, the federal funds rates implied by the two rules are similar and considerably above the actual rates while, with real-time linearly detrended data, only the rates implied by the rule with the smaller output gap coefficient are above the actual rates. With real-time data, the conclusion that the early and mid-1970s constituted a "policy mistake" is only obtained by a Taylor rule with a smaller output gap coefficient.
With a larger coefficient, one would conclude that policy was appropriately stimulative, a conclusion that is inconsistent with the onset of the Great Inflation.
It is also generally agreed that monetary policy was "on track" in the early 1990s, contributing to the Great Moderation. With revised data, the federal funds rates implied by the two rules are similar and approximately equal to the actual rates while, with real-time Greenbook data, only the rates implied by the rule with the smaller output gap coefficient are similar to the actual rates while the rates implied by the rule with the larger output gap coefficient are considerably lower than the actual rates. With real-time data, the conclusion that monetary policy was "on track" in the early 1990s is only obtained by a Taylor rule with a smaller output gap coefficient. With a larger coefficient, one would conclude that policy was not sufficiently stimulative, a conclusion that is inconsistent with the continued Great Moderation.
The size of the output gap coefficient in the Taylor rule has been a key element in monetary policy debates since the attainment of the zero lower bound for the federal funds rate in late 2008.
Taylor's (1999) use of revised GNP data with HP detrending masked the differences between the rules with smaller and larger coefficients, giving the mistaken impression that the choice of coefficients was of secondary importance. If Taylor had been able to use real-time data, it would have been clear all along that only the rule with the smaller coefficient is appropriate for historical analysis of monetary policy rules.
